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The Great Recession diers considerably from most other signicant U.S. economic declines,
as the recovery, particularly recovery in the labor market, has been remarkably slow. In fact,
the Great Recession and the Great Depression are the only severe U.S. downturns in which
job loss persisted so long following respective business cycle troughs. This paper documents
the very weak labor market recovery during the Great Recession and evaluates mortgage
modication policies as one channel for understanding why high unemployment has continued
for so long during the Great Recession. We study mortgage modications as some economists
have presented evidence linking housing market weakness to labor market weakness (Ohanian
and Rao, 2011), and because mortgage modication programs are means tested, and thus
change the incentives for home borrowers to relocate to labor markets with more favorable
job prospects.
Means-tested mortgage modications reduce the cost of staying in a home by reducing
mortgage payments, with the payment reduction based on the household's current earnings.
This includes cases in which borrower income is limited to unemployment benets and bor-
rower current debt to income ratio is well above standard levels, so that a modied mortgage
payment can be much lower than current payments. Mulligan (2009 and 2010), among oth-
ers, has suggested that this policy may be signicantly contributing to high unemployment
by distorting incentives. In addition to concerns about incentives, modication programs are
controversial because redefault rates, which are the percentage of defaults on the modied
mortgage, are high, ranging between 30 percent and 50 percent within one year of modifying.
This paper evaluates the impact of mortgage modication programs on unemployment
and other macroeconomic variables by constructing a very simple model that integrates a
model of search unemployment along the lines of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002) with a
model of home ownership, including mortgages, mortgage modications, and location choice.
By reducing mortgage payments based on current income, mortgage modication changes
the incentives to accept job oers and to relocate to labor markets with more favorable job
prospects.
In the model, households are located in a particular local labor market (island), in which
they receive stochastic job oers and whose skills evolve over time, as in Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998, 2002). Households can accept the job oer and remain in their local labor
market, reject the oer and receive unemployment benets, or relocate to another labor
market. If the household has a mortgage, they choose whether to continue with an exist-
ing mortgage, which preserves their current ow of housing services, whether to walk away
from the mortgage and rent either in their current labor market or rent in an alternative
labor market, or whether to seek a one-time modication of their mortgage which reduces
mortgage payments. Relocating is costly, but oers a job nding probability that stochasti-
cally dominates the job nding probability on a household's current island. While employed,
households accumulate skill in expectation, and while unemployed, households decumulate
2skill in expectation. By changing the cost to a borrower of maintaining an existing mortgage,
modications increase the incentives for a household to remain in their current location and
forgo more favorable job prospects in another location.
Our model of the modication process is motivated by various modication programs
that have been in place since 2007, in which modications reduce mortgage payments to a
debt service-to-income ratio (DTI) that depends on current income. Thus, households with
low income, including those whose income is limited to unemployment benets, can receive
substantial reductions in their payments that increase the opportunity cost of relocating in
the model economy.
We rst analyze the implications of modications by examining steady states of two
economies that are identical except one has modications. We next conduct an economic
turbulence experiment along the lines of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) to assess how mod-
ications impact the economy during a major recession. This experiment consists of two
shocks: (i) the layo rate in the model is doubled for one period, and (ii) for those who are
laid o, their human capital stock is reduced by one level. The main nding from this ex-
periment is that the unemployment rate rises by about 0.5 percentage points, and real GDP
declines by about 1 percent for several years after the modication policies are in place. A
number of empirical features in the model economy correspond to data, including the rate
of modications, the redefault rate on modications, and mobility. We also estimate that a
10% reduction in payments reduces the chance of a person walking away from a home by
11.3% which is comparable to Haughwout, Okah, and Tracy (2009). We are then able to
estimate that mortgagors who have a job at the date they request a modication are 48%
less likely to default again.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares the Great Recession to other
US downturns. Section 3 summarizes mortgage modication programs during the Great
Recession with a focus on the labor market impact of these policies. Section 4 presents
the model economy. Section 5 presents quantitative experiments that assess the impact of
today's modication programs. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Great Recession Compared to other US Eco-
nomic Declines
This section compares the Great Recession to other economic declines. Figures 1 and 2 com-
pare the Great Recession labor market to other postwar recessions and highlight a number
of patterns that contrast sharply with those in other downturns. Figure 1 shows employ-
ment following each recession, and Figure 2 shows employment during the Great Recession
compared to the average of all other postwar recessions. Even abstracting from the size of
employment loss during the recession, these two gures clearly suggest labor market dys-
function, in which employment during the Great Recession is not recovering at a normal
3rate.
Figure 3 combines information from both the recession and the recovery by showing
employment change in all post World War II recessions 36 months after the start of the
recession. There are only two postwar recessions that do not feature employment recovery
3 years after the start of a recession - the 2000-01 recession and the Great Recession. Note,
however, that the 2000-01 recession was relatively mild so that despite the slow recovery,
employment was only about one percent lower three years after the start of that recession.
In contrast, employment during Great Recession is nearly 6 percent lower three years after
it started. In terms of the most recent severe recessions, both the 1973 and 1981 recessions
feature rapid labor market recoveries, with employment rising three percent above previous
business cycle peak values.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Tables 1 and 2 provide a more comprehensive comparison between the Great Recession
and other recessions, and present additional evidence that the recovery from the Great
Depression has been very slow. Table 1 shows the average recovery for detrended (2 percent
annual growth) per capita output and its components and per capita employment through 6
quarters for all postwar recessions except the Great Recession. In the average recovery from
a postwar recession, the economy is quite close to returning to trend. Table 2 shows the
same variables for the Great Recession, which shows virtually no recovery relative to trend
for any variable, with the exception of investment. This pattern is qualitatively very similar
to that in the Great Depression.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Table 4 shows the same variables for the 1981-82 recession, which is the last severe re-
cession in the U.S. The recovery from the 1981-82 recession is quite fast, with all variables,
including employment, either very close to trend or even above trend. This rapid recovery
following the 1981-82 recession is consistent with standard neoclassical growth theory, which
predicts that recoveries should be relatively fast following severe recessions, reecting tran-
sition dynamics associated with diminishing marginal product of capital and low investment
during the recession.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
This evidence indicates that the recovery from the Great Recession has been compara-
tively very slow, with the restoration of jobs and output proceeding much more slowly than
their postwar averages.
The only comparable episode in which a severe downturn was followed by such a slow
4recovery is the Great Depression. Table 3 shows the severe depth and duration of the
Depression, with relatively little recovery after its 1933 trough. Specically, relative to 1929,
per capita output is about 39 percent below trend, consumption is about 28 percent below
trend, investment is about 75 percent below trend, and employment is about 25 percent
below trend. And both the Great Depression and the Great Recession feature virtually no
recovery in consumption, indicating that factors that are considered to be permanent are
contributing to the slow recovery.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
What accounts for such slow recoveries, particularly in the labor market during these
episodes? Ohanian (2009), and Cole and Ohanian (2004) present theoretic and empirical
evidence that the severity of the Depression and the continuation of Depression signicantly
reect industrial and labor policies that increased industrial cartelization and increased labor
bargaining power which in turn substantially increased relative prices and real wages. The
real manufacturing wages (relative to trend) rose approximately 17 percent from 1929 - 1939,
which is abnormal from the perspective of the normal forces of supply and demand. Speci-
cally, low consumption and high unemployment during the decade should have reduced real
wages and expanded employment relative to its low level. Ohanian (2009) presents evidence
that high real wages during the early phases of the Depression were the result of Hoover's
nominal wage maintenance program in which Hoover promised rms protection from labor
unions provided that industry maintain nominal wage levels and preserve jobs through work
sharing, while Cole and Ohanian (2004) present evidence that New Deal policies that pro-
moted monopoly and union formation, including the National Industrial Recovery Act, and
the National Labor Relations Act, fostered higher real wages.
This interpretation of the Great Depression places economic policy, in particular, policies
that distorted competition and prevented some markets from clearing, at the center of the
Great Depression and its labor market dysfunction. Some economists have also suggested
that economic policies are contributing to the persistence of high unemployment today.
Specically, the federal minimum wage increased by about 24 percent, rising from $5.85 in
2007 to $6.55 in 2008 and then to $7.25 in July, 2009, which may have priced a number
of lower skill workers out of the job market. Some economists also point to a number of
executive orders signed by President Obama designed to promote the use of union contractors
on large-scale federal construction projects.
This paper analyzes an alternative policy channel that can connect the coincidence be-
tween the severity of housing sector depression and the failure of the labor market to recover.
In particular, Ohanian and Rao (2011) document that the only OECD countries to expe-
rience severe labor market dysfunction during the Great Recession were also the countries
with the most severe housing market downturns: Ireland, Spain, and the U.S. The other
OECD countries had much less employment loss and much less housing sector contraction.
We therefore analyze the impact of mortgage modications on persistently high levels of U.S.
unemployment. Mulligan (2009 and 2010) has suggested that these policies distort individ-
5ual behavior by changing the incentives to take jobs. We pursue this idea by considering the
impact of mortgage modications on location choice. In particular, by reducing the cost of
servicing a mortgage, modications change the incentives to relocate to labor markets with
better job opportunities.
3 Mortgage Modications During the Great Recession
This section summarizes mortgage modications since 2007. Table 5 provides a national per-
spective on mortgage accounts (90 million accounts by 2010), broad modications as dened
below (11.4 million since 2007), and foreclosure starts (5.8 million since 2007). Following
Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009), we dene a mortgage modication as a change in the
interest rate, principal, or the term of the mortgage, or more broadly, as any change to
a mortgage that increases or decreases the present value of the loan (many modications
merely tack the current `forgiven' portion of the debt onto the end of the loan as a balloon
payment). This may include an immediate payment in exchange for forgiveness of principal,
such as a short sale (a pre-foreclosure sale) and a deed-in-lieu, in which a mortgagor hands
over collateral property in exchange for a release from all obligations.
HOPE NOW estimates that there have been about 14.2 million modications that satisfy
one of these modication denitions. Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) nd that roughly
three percent of borrowers 90 days or more in arrears in their sample of mortgages, which
covers roughly 60% of all mortgages through 2008:4, received a narrowly dened modication,
while eight percent received a broader form of modication.
Modications fall into one of two categories, government modication programs developed
by, or associated with, either the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), or the Home
Aordable Modication Program (HAMP), and other modication programs. Almost all
modications change the mortgagor's current payment by changing the mortgage interest
rate and/or the time prole of payments, and/or changing the term of the mortgage, and/or
deferring payment of principal or forbearance. There have been about 1.9 million HAMP
modications, which accounts for about 17 percent of all permanent modications, including
the broad denition of modications, and all other programs account for about 83 percent
of modications.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
The three main government programs are HAMP, the FDIC Loan Modication Program,
and the Federal Home Finance Agency Streamlined Modication Program. All the govern-
ment programs feature modications that reduce payments to either 31 percent or 38 percent
of current income (DTI). This is accomplished by reducing the mortgage payment, subject
6to a minimum interest rate. This minimum interest rate is operative for a xed period,
after which the interest rate rises over time. If the initial interest rate adjustment does not
satisfy the DTI requirement, then the term of the mortgage is increased, up to a maximum
of 40 years. If these modications together do not generate the required DTI, then principal
is deferred to the end of the mortgage as a balloon payment in order to satisfy the DTI
requirement of the program, and this deferred principal does not accumulate interest. Some
programs also provided benets to borrowers by paying o principal, waiving late fees, and
re-capitalizing arrears in principal, interest, and taxes. The median DTI for those receiving
HAMP modications is about 45 percent of current income when debt only includes mort-
gage principal, interest, homeowners insurance, and property taxes (front end DTI). The
median "back end" DTI is nearly 80 percent for HAMP modiers, as this broader measure
of debt includes other mandated payments, including credit card, auto, and other debt, and
spousal and child support.
We focus on HAMP modications since they represent the most frequently used modi-
cation among the government programs. Other government programs and non-government
programs are similar along several dimensions. The main exception is that some programs re-
duce DTI for eligible applicants to 38 percent, rather than HAMP's 31 percent. Descriptions
of some of the other programs is in Herkenho and Ohanian (2011b).
3.1 Home Aordable Modication Program (HAMP)
This section summarizes the HAMP program and how it evolved over time. The Making
Home Aordable (MHA) Program was announced in February of 2009 and operative by
March of 2009. The program touted $75 billion for mortgage modications. However ac-
cording to the Treasury's expense report, only $1 billion was spent through 2010. There
were several changes to the program on June 1, 2010, but for the sake of space, we will only
describe the Pre-June 1, 2010 version of HAMP:
Eligibility: HAMP eligibility criteria are listed below (loosely quoted from the HAMP
Servicer Guide, 2009):
1. The mortgage loan is a rst lien mortgage loan originated on or before January 1, 2009.
2. The mortgage loan has not been previously modied under the HAMP.
3. The mortgage loan is delinquent or default is reasonably foreseeable.
4. The borrower documents a nancial hardship by completing a Home Aordable Modi-
cation Program Hardship Adavit and provides the required income documentation.
The documentation supporting income may not be more than 90 days old.
5. The borrower has a monthly mortgage payment ratio of greater than 31 percent (mort-
gage payment over gross income).
76. A borrower actively involved in a bankruptcy proceeding is eligible for HAMP at the
servicer's discretion.
7. The current unpaid principal balance is no greater than $729,750.
8. The loan must pass a standardized NPV test that compares the NPV result for a mod-
ication to the NPV result for no modication. If the NPV result for the modication
scenario is greater than the NPV result for no modication, the servicer MUST oer
the modication, otherwise the servicer has the option of performing the modication
in its discretion.
Unemployment Eligibility: Unemployed persons are eligible and unemployment
benets count as qualied income. The February 2010 report includes statistics on the
main hardship reasons. Roughly 57% of the permanent modications were for people with
employment problems, including outright unemployment.
Terms of Modication:
1. A borrower may be asked to complete a trial period. The trial period typically lasts 3
months. During this period the bank veries income and assesses whether the borrower
can make the new payments.
2. If a borrower has an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) or interest-only mortgage, the
existing interest rate will convert to a xed interest rate, fully amortizing loan.
3. The following steps outline the process for determining the 31 percent monthly mort-
gage payment ratio:
(a) Capitalize accrued interest, out-of-pocket escrow advances to third parties, and
any other third party fees that are reasonable and necessary.
(b) Reduce the interest rate. The interest rate oor in all cases is 2.0 percent. The
reduced rate will be in eect for the rst ve years followed by annual increases of
one percent per year (or such lesser amount as may be needed) until the interest
rate reaches the Interest Rate Cap, at which time it will be xed for the remaining
loan term.1
(c) If necessary, extend the term and reamortize the mortgage loan by up to 480
months to achieve the target monthly mortgage payment ratio.
(d) If necessary, the servicer must provide for principal forbearance to achieve the
target monthly mortgage payment ratio. The principal forbearance amount is
non-interest bearing and non-amortizing. The amount of principal forbearance
1The `Interest Rate Cap' is the Freddie Mac Weekly Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS) Rate for
30-year xed rate conforming loans as of the modication date.
8will result in a balloon payment fully due and payable upon the earliest of the
borrower's transfer of the property, payo of the interest bearing unpaid principal
balance, or maturity of the mortgage loan.
Performance: By June 1, 2010 there were 398,021 permanent modications and 1,300,526
trials had been started. The January 2011 Making Home Aordable report claims that the
Pre-June 1,2010 conversion rate (from trial to permanent) was roughly 41%. For HAMP
modications started in 2009:4, 81.6% had payment reductions of 20% or more.2 Figure 4
illustrates the redefault rates (which means the loan is again at least 60+ days delinquent)
for a cohort of HAMP permanent modications. Annual redefault rates reach 30% even with
sizeable reductions. Figure 4 also illustrates the redefault rates for government-guaranteed
loans (e.g. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Insured), government sponsored enter-
prise loans (e.g. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, see below), private loans with no government
aliation, and the loan portfolio of the participating institutions (i.e. the loans that the
banks do not service for someone else).
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
Failed Trials and Rejections: Of those who had their trial period canceled, 44.2%
received an alternative modication, 5.9% were somewhere in the foreclosure process, and
only 6% were current.3 A person who fails a trial is no longer eligible for HAMP; however,
a rejected person may re-apply. Pre-June 1, 2010, the lack of paperwork necessary led to
many unsuccessful modications.4
3.2 Alternative Modications
HOPE NOW reports that of the approximately 4.2 million permanent modications, 3.6
million were completed independently of HAMP guidelines. Pre-March 4, 2009, there was
no HAMP criteria and the streamlined modications were used scarcely. The Pre-HAMP
modication performance is relatively poor. Very few loans are current (a mere 24%), and
even fewer have actually been foreclosed upon (11% completed, 16% in process).5 Table 6
details a Post-HAMP comparison of the modications. The HAMP reductions hover around
35-40% and the alternative reductions are also considerably generous around 15-20%. The
alternative modications were similar in several respects to HAMP, though often focused
on reducing payments to 38 percent DTI for eligible applicants, instead of 31 percent as in
HAMP.
For those who did not satisfy one or more eligibility criteria, modications were still
performed outside of HAMP, but in these cases, payments were reduced less than under
2OTS 2010:3 Report
3HAMP Servicer Performance Report Through January 2011
4See Flyod Norris' 2009 article in the NY Times entitled, `Why Many Home Loan Modications Fails.'
5OTS 2010:4 Report
9HAMP, and as we will see below, led to higher redefault rates. Specically, about 44 percent
of canceled HAMP trials obtain an alternative modication and about 30 percent of denied
applicants obtain an alternative modication.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
We now describe the performance of these modications in terms of redefault rates,
which are defaults on modied mortgages. Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) nd that
the redefault rate for Pre-HAMP loans lies between 30% and 50%. Furthermore, there
is a large fraction of loans (30%) that have a larger Net Present Value (NPV) after the
modication. They also reported that `fewer than 5 % of all of our troubled [90+ days past
due] borrowers repaid their mortgages.'
In terms of reallocation, the government is allowing people to maintain their mismatch
with the local labor market by providing loan modications. Clearly those who could not pay
their mortgages initially are redefaulting. The process of modifying and then redefaulting is
precisely the delay that we focus on in the model below.
3.3 Analyses of Current Modication Programs
We are unaware of studies that quantify the impact of modication programs on unem-
ployment within an optimizing model framework. There are several related papers including
Mulligan (2010) who considers the implicit marginal tax rates generated by actual guidelines
for FDIC and HAMP modications. Mulligan (2009) also discusses the incentive eects of
mortgage modications on employment, and suggests that modications have signicantly
increased unemployment, but he does not provide a quantitative assessment. Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2009) consider the HAMP program in a single location DSGE model with en-
dogenous prices, but their model lacks an employment margin and therefore does not allow
for employment incentive eects or relocation. Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) argue
that there are few modications because lenders expect to make more money foreclosing
than modifying. Their conclusion is that preventable foreclosures are rarer than most people
believe. The probability of redefault in their sample ranges between 30% and 50% depending
on the quality of the mortgage and the type of modication. If a modication uses resources,
it may be socially optimal to have few modications. Gerardi and Li (2010) provide a useful
summary and timeline of the policies that were enacted to save homes.
In terms of the link between housing and unemployment, Oswald (1996) hypothesized
that areas with high homeownership rates have higher unemployment rates. Green and
Hendershott (2001) use a 1988-1992 PSID panel to track 9000 US household outcomes over
time. Among their ndings, they present evidence that supports the Oswald hypothesis and
found signicant heterogeneity in the eect of homeownership on unemployment outcomes.
There are also studies that have presented evidence against the Oswald Hypothesis. These
studies primarily are based on European data. Vuuren (2009) studies panel data from the
10Netherlands and rejects a number of predictions of the Oswald hypothesis.
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998) consider homeownership and mobility and argue that
homeowners are less mobile. Studies based on US data from the recent recession include
Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (2009), who use a panel from the American Housing Survey to
document that negative equity (which is much more prevalent than modications) greatly
reduces mobility. Schulhofer-Wohl (2010) disputes these mobility claims, suggesting that the
empirical methodology of Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy is awed. Winkler (2011) analyzes
homeownership and homeowner mobility, and nds that homeownership reduces mobility by
40 percent and that homeownership also negatively impacts income.6 While Winkler does
not consider mortgage modications, his economic environment is perhaps the closest to ours
in that he also uses an optimizing model that includes locational choice.
4 Model Economy
This section presents the model economy we use to assess the impact of mortgage modica-
tion programs on economic activity. We blend a search model of unemployment with housing
and with the choice of relocating from one local labor market (island) to another island. To
focus on the relocation eect and to keep the model tractable, we model only the consumer
side of the economy and treat prices exogenously. Herkenho and Ohanian (2011a) consider
the employment incentive eect along with the large eviction delays in a related paper.
Households face a constant probability of death (), and maximize the sum of expected
utility discounted using a xed interest rate (rh). With a one month period, this means




12 . They have preferences
over sequences of a nondurable consumption good (c) and a ow of housing services, which
is higher if a household owns a home (zm) rather than rents, (zr). Mortgages are treated as a
perpetuity. Thus owning a home requires making a xed mortgage payment each period ( m).
The mortgage payment is tax-deductible. Renters pay a rental payment (r) each period, but
this payment is not tax-deductible.
Households are located on one of two symmetric islands, A or B. They are either employed
(W) or unemployed (U). Each period, each household receives a wage oer drawn from a
stationary Markov chain. Households can either accept the oer or reject the oer and
receive unemployment benets. The household can also choose to relocate to the alternative
island which oers a job nding distribution that stochastically dominates the distribution
6He also nds that after a labor shock, the homeowner subgroup has an unemployment rate that is
6% higher one or more years after the shock as compared to before the shock. However, renters show no
signicant dierence in unemployment rates. The estimated job oer equation implies that the probability of
receiving a job oer from another location is increasing in education (skill in our model). He also estimates
the following oer rates: 16% of renters receive oers per period, 13% of homeowners receive oers per
period.
11in their current island. If they relocate, they exit from their home permanently and incur a
one time utility cost, (MC).
Mortgage modications are challenging to model as these programs may include many
changes to the mortgage contract, several of which are dicult to represent recursively.
Because mortgages are a perpetuity, all modications are a temporary reduction in payments
which is exactly what HAMP and other modication programs do. This temporary reduction
can lower payments enough so that people who would otherwise move choose to remain in
their current location. We call this change in incentives to relocate the relocation eect of
mortgage modications.7
In our model, households may request a modication, but one time only, as is the case
with many modication programs. A modication in the model works as follows. As long
as an agent has a DTI between 31% and 75% (in the model notation described below,
DTI >  m
wA > DTI), the agent is eligible for a temporary modication that reduces mortgage
payments as a fraction of their current gross income to 31%. However, to keep the state space
tractable, the modication term ends with probability . Since the modication depends on
the mortgagor's current income, this means-testing of modications means that the incentives
to relocate in order to sample a better wage distribution are distorted, as the opportunity
cost of relocating is higher, reecting the fact that relocating means losing the modication.
Each agent's skills evolve over time, and skill evolution depends on employment status,
which is motivated by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002). Specically, while employed,
an agent's skills can increase or decrease, and the probability of increasing their skill level
exceeds the probability of receiving a lower skill. For unemployed agents, their skills on
average depreciate. Let A denote the skill of an agent on island A. The skill transitions
are governed by a Markov chain which is described in Section 4.3. We assume that the
probability of nding a job increases monotonically with skill. To capture this, f(A), which
is the job nding probability for an agent with skill A, is monotonically increasing. Layos
occur with probability 1   pe, with pe denoting the probability of job continuation.
The period budget constraint for an employed mortgage borrower with taxable income I
is given by:
c +  m(1   l(I)) + Tm = wA(1   l(I))
Employed agents earn income wA where w scales the skill level, A. Agents face a pro-
gressive income tax schedule which is summarized by the function l(). We use progressive
income taxes as it allows the model to help match observed home ownership rates by increas-
ing the incentive to own a home as income rises. This allows the model to generate regions
in the state space in which consumers prefer renting, and regions in which consumers prefer
a mortgage. The tax function is piecewise linear, which we describe in detail in Section 4.2.
7This model of modications does not include another important element of the HAMP modication,
which is a trial period for a modication. Specically, in a trial period, the borrower may decline some oers
because this would result in a more expensive modication later.
12After-tax income nances non-durable consumption (c), the after-tax mortgage payment,
 m(1   l(I)), and Tm; which is obligated payments corresponding to other homeownership
costs including property insurance and homeowner association fees, and in addition, includes
other mandated payments such as revolving debt service, child support, and spousal support.
These other obligated payments are important to include in the model since their level aects
the incentive to request a mortgage modication. Renters also face obligated costs, (Tr),
where Tr < Tm.
If an agent cannot nance a mortgage, which means that the level of other obligated pay-
ments is greater than or equal to income, then the mortgagor is forced to leave the home and
rent. While unemployed, agents are provided with unemployment benets b(A). Benets
are weakly monotone in the skill level with a 50% replacement rate and an benet cap of
 b (see Section 4.2). As skills decumulate, benets expire. This declining path of benets is
adopted because it allows us to formulate the problem recursively while maintaining compu-
tational tractability. Moreover, this declining time path of benets in the model reects the
fact that benets do indeed decline over time.8 Specically, extended benets or emergency
unemployment compensation, which apply in many states after 26 weeks can fall to only
24 percent of the original benet level. Moreover, it is likely that other sources of nancial
support that unemployed individuals receive, including support from family, friends, unions,
and charities also decline.
An agent that searches on another island nds a job with probability f(0
B), where 0
B





represent the status of an agent. W(A) is the value
function of an agent with an oer and skill level A. U(A) is the value function of an agent
without an oer and skill level A. W M(A;) is the value function of an agent with an
oer and a mortgage payment that has been reduced by 100  (1   )%. In other words,
 = :75 indicates a 25% reduction in payments. UM(A;) is dened similarly for an agent
without an oer. W R(A) is the value function of a renter that has an oer and skill level
A. UR(A) is dened similarly for an agent without an oer. In general, the superscript
M indicates that the agent currently has a modication and the agent is no longer eligible
to have a modication in the future. The M superscript will stay with an agent even when
 = 1, which means that the temporary modication period is over and the agent pays 1  m.
The superscript R indicates that the agent is a renter.
As indicated above, mortgages are perpetuities with xed payments. Once an agent
8Emergency Unemployment Compensation has dierent stages called `tiers.' With each tier there is a
duration and a replacement rate. Tier 1 lasts 20 weeks and pays 80% of the maximum benet amount. Tier
2 lasts 14 weeks and pays 54% of the maxmimum benet amount, and so on. The last tier pays 24% of the
maximum benet amount.
13defaults on a mortgage, the agent is a renter for the remainder of their lifetime. Agents
are only allowed one modication in a lifetime, and the modication is structured to reduce
payments to 31% of gross income. The modication term is stochastic: with probability  a
modication ends. When a modication ends, the mortgage payment returns to its original
level  m.
Gross income is wA for employed people and b(A) for unemployed people. At the time
of the modication request, , which denotes the mortgage payment reduction, is set so that
the new payment    m is 31 percent of income:
(wA)  m
wA = :31. After this initial period,
 becomes a xed state variable and will only change once the modication ends. When
the modication period is over,  ! 1, reecting the fact that payments return back to  m.
Mortgagors who decide to default or redefault are subject to a one-time moving cost  MC
which reects the costs of leaving the home.
There are two important states for a mortgagor with no previous modication activity,
the skill level A and the employment status which is summarized by S. For this type of
agent QS(A) describes the choice set. This choice set will reect eligibility restrictions for
modications. For instance, if the agent has an oer (S = W) and the payment ratio falls
between the cap and the eligibility cuto, DTI >  m




Accept Oer and Pay; Accept Oer and Modify;
Reject Oer and Pay, Reject Oer and Default
	
If  m
wA < DTI or  m




Accept Oer and Pay, Reject Oer and Pay,
Reject Oer and Default
	
There are three key states for a modied mortgagor, the skill level A, the modication
payment reduction , and the employment status summarized by S. For this type of agent




Search for Job and Pay, Redefault and Move
	
In the value functions below, we drop the state A which is already summarized in
the value function, and we refer to QS as the choice set that implicitly summarizes the
qualication criteria.
An agent that begins with an oer and has not previously modied starts the period
with a value function W(A). Recall that taxable income is given by (I). The agent has







14accumulate on the job skills, and face some probability of being red (1   pe), (ii) skip a
payment and request a modication (so long as the the payment ratio lies between DTI and
DTI) (iii) reject the oer (notice that there is no lag between certain states), or (iv) default








































U(A);  MC + WR(A)
)
An agent that begins with an oer and a modied mortgage (either currently modied or
modied in the past) starts the period with a value function W M(A;). With probability
















A;1) + (1   pe)UM(0
A;1)
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UM(A;);  MC + WR(A)
)
An agent that begins the period without an oer and has not previously modied starts the
period with a value function U(A). The agent has several choices: (i) pay the mortgage,






, decumulate skills while unemployed,
and search locally which results in a job with probability f(A) (ii) skip a payment and ask
for a modication (so long as the the payment ratio lies between DTI and DTI), or (iii)
















































  MC + UR(A)
)
An agent that has no oer and a modied mortgage (either currently modied or modied
sometime in the past) starts the period with a value function UM(A;). With probability































  MC + UR(A)
)
An agent that begins the period renting with an oer has a value function W R(A). This
agent has two choices: (i) continue to work on the same island, or (ii) quit and pick an island

















An agent that begins the period renting without an oer has a value function UR(A).
UR(A) = u
 






















4.2 Functional Forms, Parameters, and Results
The utility function is given by:
u(c;z) = log(c) + z
The job nding probability is strongly monotone in the interior, and weakly monotone in
the tails. This functional form captures the intuition that it is easier for persons with high
skills to nd jobs.9








This job nding function is graphed in Figure 5 for fc = 3=10; which is used in the simu-
lations. The expected job nding rate on the alternative island is also graphed, and shows
the expectation of an island A agent with skill A nding a job on island B. This functional
form is in line with Shimer's (2008) estimate that the probability of being reemployed in the
9Mincer (1991) presents evidence supporting this choice. We make use of the following notation: x is the
lower bound of x and x is the upper bound of x.
16next month, on average, for all workers in the Current Population Survey dataset is 28.6%.
We match on average that renters have 3% more job oers, as estimated in Winkler (2011).
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
Unemployment benets are monotone in the lower half of the support with a 50% re-
placement rate, but benets are capped by  b. For the simulations that follow,  b is set
approximately to one half the mean observed wage. Given the skill process described below,




 w  min

A   A; b
	
The income tax function is described below:
l(I) = 1=5I(I < I1=5) +  + 4=5I(I3=5 < I < I4=5) + 5=5I(I4=5 < I)
This describes an average rate that is applied to all labor income, and the cutos are






The period length is one month. Given the period length, there are several parameter
values: the wage (w), the interest rate (rh), the death probability (), the probability that a
modication ends (), the probability of continued employment (pe), the modication cutos
for debt-to-income (DTI and DTI),the mortgage payment ( m), the rental payment (r), the
housing utility ow (zm), the renter utility ow (zr), non-mortgage debt payments for a
homeowner (Tm), non-mortgage debt payments for a renter (Tr), the costs of foreclosure
and leaving a house, (MC), the tax schedule l(), the grid for skill levels, the transition
probabilities, and the initial draws.
The wage rate is set to unity. The annual household discount is set to 6%, which is in
line with Lipshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2006). The death probability  is set such that
the average lifetime is 42 years.  follows from the HAMP modication program which
reduces payments for 5 years. The probability of remaining employed, pe is set to match
the average job duration of 4.6 years.10 Modications reduce mortgage payments to 31% of
current gross income. The upper limit on debt to income, DTI = :75; is set to match the
modication rate (note that by picking the cap to match this moment, the initial front-end
DTI of a mortgagor is larger than in the data since the option value of modifying skews
this decision) and DTI = :31 is taken from the HAMP servicer manual. The xed mortgage
payment  m is set such that in the absence of modications, the average mortgage payment
to income ratio is 20% as in Corbae and Quintin (2010). The rental payment r is set to
90% of the mortgage payment.11 The ow from housing zm is picked to be the log of the
average mortgage payment zm = log( m). zr is scaled in proportion to payments: zr = r
 mzm.
The xed cost for a mortgagor, Tm, is set to match the dierence between the back-end and
front-end DTI of a modier which is roughly 30% in the HAMP Data. Tr is set to match the
fraction of people renting, which is about 35%.12 The cost of foreclosure and leaving a house
to become a renter, MC, is set to one year's worth of the median wage in order to match
the annual migration rate of 6.3% as reported in Davis, Fischer, and Veracierto (2010).13
Once an agent becomes a renter, the agent is free to move between locations without any
additional cost. The tax schedule l() matches the average eective tax rates by income
quintile as published by the Congressional Budget Oce.14 By quintile, the tax rates are
4.3%, 9.9%, 14.1%, 17.3%, and 25.2%.
The grid for A has 7 nodes that are evenly spaced between [1
2,141
2]. Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2002) use a process calibrated to 2 weeks with 11 nodes. In their model, agents lose
one node with a 10% chance. We follow their setup and have agents move down twice as
10Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).
11American Housing Survey for the United States: 2003, Table 2-13, Selected Housing Costs and Occupied
Units
1266% Homeownership rate in the 2000 Census
13While this may seem high, this is conservative in lieu of Kennan and Walker (2011) who nd an average
moving cost of $312,000.
14CBO, Historical Eective Federal Tax Rates: 1979 to 2005 December 2007
18fast in the unemployed state (10% chance of moving down one level every 4 weeks while un-
employed, 5% change of moving down one level every 4 weeks while employed). Agents keep
their original skill level 80% of the time while employed, 85% of the time while unemployed,
and 75% of the time when searching on another island. Employed agents move up one slot
with a probability of 15% and unemployed agents move up one slot with a probability of 5%
(in our model, unlike Ljunqvist and Sargent, the unemployed can increase their skill level).
A person who searches on another island moves up one slot 15% of the time and moves up
two slots 10% of the time.
This human capital process captures much of the dispersion and volatility of monthly
income. According to monthly Survey of Income and Participation Program (SIPP) data
from 2001, the coecient of variation (=) for monthly income ranges from .78 to .26
depending on where an individual falls relative to the poverty line (e.g. those at least 150%
above the poverty line have an average CV of .31 for monthly earnings and .28 for monthly
income).15
Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the moments that we try to match by picking appropriate
parameters. Several other references are included in the tables for completeness.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
[Insert Table 8 Here]
5 The Impact of Mortgage Modications in the Model
Economy
The following section presents analyses to evaluate the quantitative impact of modica-
tions on unemployment levels, unemployment duration, and skill levels (productivity). We
consider two experiments: (1) a comparison of steady states between an economy with no
modications and one with modications, (2) a one-time economic turbulence analysis along
the lines of Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998 and 2002), in which we follow the economy over
time after there is a one-time, unanticipated, large, exogenous destruction of jobs.
5.1 Steady State Comparison
We solved for a stationary mass of agents using the techniques outlined in Hopenhayn (1992).
We use value function iteration on the grids described above to solve for the policy functions,
and we proxy the unit mass of agents on each island with a large number of simulated
agents. The stationary mass of 300,000 agents is symmetric across islands, with island A
movers exactly oset by replica island B movers. The results in Table 9 below are for
15Bania and Leete (2009)
19an economy that gives modications in the same proportion as observed in HAMP data.
To capture current conditions, the newly born agents are born with mortgages, they are
randomly endowed with skills over skill slots 2 to 6, and 9% of them start unemployed.16
[Insert Table 9 Here]
5.2 Steady State Discussion
The duration of unemployment increases in the modication economy, which is the con-
sequence of the lower incentive to relocate. Specically, low skill workers and unemployed
mortgagors receive on average large mortgage payment discounts to reduce payments to 31%
of their currrent income. The modication program thus subsidizes unemployment/low skills
by reducing the opportunity cost of staying in the local labor market. In the no-modication
world, there is no such subsidy and as a result the incentive to relocate to the labor market
with better job prospects is higher. As a consequence, the modication policies generate 30
basis points of higher unemployment. Unemployment is about 50 basis points higher in the
turbulence experiment, which is described below.
In addition to the 30 basis point steady state dierence in unemployment, the average
duration of unemployment in the modication economy is about one week longer, which is
about a 10 percent increase. Duration increases because there are more households staying
in local (poor job prospect) labor markets. By moving, households expect to move up one
skill level, and this is proportional to their chance of nding a job. This implication of higher
unemployment duration in the modication economy is consistent with a key fact reported
by Winkler (2011), which is that homeowners have a lower hazard rate out of unemployment
after an adverse labor shock.
Mobility falls in the modication economy to a migration rate of about 8 percent per
year, compared to a 10 percent migration rate in the economy without modications. This
impact on mobility is moderate compared to that estimated by Kennan and Walker (2011),
who nd that a $10,000 subsidy for moving results in a two percentage point rise in mobility.
In our model, agents receive a 45% reduction in payments on average for 5 years. Mapping
this into the $6,000 median annual reduction in payments observed in HAMP data, then
there is an undiscounted subsidy to modiers of about $30,000, which is about 1/3 as large
as that estimated by Kennan and Walker.
We also nd that the quarterly foreclosure rate is about 20 basis points lower in the
modication economy, and the fraction of renters is much lower. The foreclosure rate is higher
in the no-modication economy for the same reason that unemployment is lower, which is
because more households leave the local labor market when modications are unavailable.
While the dierence in the foreclosure rates between the two economies is fairly small, there
are large dierences in the number of renters. Because modications are always available,
16Recall, there are 7 possible skill slots, so agents are not started in the extremes
20this quarterly 20 basis point dierence generates a much higher steady state mass of renters.
Specically, about 48 percent are renters in the non-modication steady state, while about
38 percent are renters in the modication steady state.
To compare our results to those in the literature, we estimated the following equation:
Di;t=12 = 0 + 1i;t=1 + 2i;t=1 + 3JOi;t=1 + i
The variable i indexes the individual. We estimate this in the cross section where Di;t=12
is an indicator of default within 12 months after modication, i;t=1 is the skill level at the
date of modication, i;t=1 is the payment reduction expressed as a fraction, JOi;t=1 is a job
oer indicator at the date of modication, and i is the error term.
The estimated results, which are in Table 10, are very similar to the empirical results
presented in Haughwout, Okah,and Tracy (2009) who estimate a proportional hazard model
of the form Dt = exp((t))exp(X). Since their coecients are in a non-separable expo-
nential form, it is dicult to directly compare the results. However, they report, that \the
data indicate that a 10 percent reduction in the required monthly mortgage payment is
associated with around a 13 percent reduction in the re-default hazard." In our model, if
payments are reduced by 10% (i.e.  is reduced by .1), then the redefault probability falls by
11:3% = :1  1:13  100. This is roughly the same as their empirical results. Haughwout et
al. did not have data on individual employment status, but our model provides results about
this eect on redefault. Our estimated equation predicts that a person who has a job at the
date of requesting a modication is 48% less likely to default one year later as compared
to an unemployed person. Likewise, an increase in skill, which is a proxy for income, also
reduces the probability of default.
The median modied mortgage payment declines by about 45 percent, compared to a
median decline of about 40 percent reported by HAMP. Without the cap on the qualifying
DTI, the reduction in the model would be much larger, as households would tend to wait
to take the modication until their income is very low. Given that payments are reduced
to 31% of current income and a modication can be taken one time only, there is an option
value to wait to modify.
[Insert Table 10 Here]
215.3 Economic Turbulence Experiment
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002) analyze the impact of labor market policies by conduct-
ing what they refer to as `turbulence experiments.' Specically, they analyze policies in an
economy which has a one-time large, exogenous destruction of jobs, and in which the skill
level of the unemployed declines. We pursue a similar turbulence experiment to analyze the
consequences of mortgage modications in the model with a one-time, large job destruction
and a reduction in skills of those who are unemployed.
Specically, our turbulence experiment is as follows: (i) we double the layo rate (2 
(1   pe)) for 1 period, and (ii) for those who are laid o, their skill level is cut by 1 notch
from their initial condition skill level. The layo shock and skill shock are unanticipated. We
simulate a unit mass (approximated by 300,000 individuals) and follow them for 2 years after
the shock, and compare the following variables over time between the modication economy
and the non-modication economy: (a) the unemployment rate, (b) average skill level, (c)
modication rate, (d) the redefault rate, and (e) the unemployment survival function. Mod-
ications are allowed one time only, and can be applied for from the initial date of the shock
until the end of year 2. The results of this experiment are illustrated in Figures 6 to 9.
[Insert Figure 6 Here]
[Insert Figure 7 Here]
[Insert Figure 8 Here]
[Insert Figure 9 Here]
The initial conditions, which are identical across the modication and no-modication
economies, are as follows: 35% begin as renters, 65% begin as mortgagors, and the intial
mean Front-End DTI is 14% with a 2% standard deviation. The initial mean Back-End DTI
is 21% with a 4% standard deviation. The initial skills are distributed uniformly over skill
slots 3 to 6.17 Figures 6 to 9 compare the turbulence experiments for the modication and
non-modication economies.
5.4 Turbulence Discussion
The main ndings are that modications raise unemployment, increase the duration of un-
employment, reduce the average skill level, reduce worker mobility, and reduce foreclosures.
Specically, the unemployment rate in the modication economy is about one half percentage
higher than in the non-modication economy. The 0.5 percent dierence in unemployment
is reached after about 10 months, and continues at about that level for the 30 month horizon
that we have examined. While this program does not account for the bulk of the increase in
current unemployment, it does generate a persistent increase in unemployment, correspond-
17There are 7 slots in total, and no one begins in the extremes
22ing to about 730,000 unemployed individuals, given the current size of the US labor force.
Unemployment duration in the modication economy is about 18.1 weeks, compared to 17.3
weeks in the economy without modications.
The average skill level of the employed in the modication economy is about 0.5 percent
lower than in the non-modication economy. Figure 7 illustrates that this dierence grows
over time as the low skilled unemployed modiers eventually reintegrate back into the work-
force and drag down the average. It is interesting to note that the modication rate in the
rst year following the job destruction shock is about four percent, which is close to the
peak rate of modications of 4.5 percent in 2009. The median modier in this economy has
a back end DTI of 0.88 as compared to a back end DTI of 0.79 in the data.
Despite relatively generous modications, there are a number of redefaults in the modi-
cation economy. Many of those who lose their job in the turbulence experiment choose to
modify immediately. Of those who modify, many redefault shortly afterwards. Specically,
41 percent of modiers redefault within one year, which is very similar to the 48 percent
rate reported by the Oce of Thrift Supervision for overall mortgages (OTS 2010-IV, Table
3). As in actual experience, many modications are unsuccessful from the perspective of
keeping the mortgagor in their home. Of those who successfully modify, it is precisely those
with low skill who pay their modied mortgages that create the dierence between the two
economies. These successful modiers change the speed of recovery by delaying relocation
to better job markets. Moreover, note that while the redefault rates settle down over time,
there is still a persistent ow of new modications even after the initial shock. This means
that agents who do not lose their job in the initial period of job destruction do make use the
modication afterwards.
These results also have implications for the recent change in the Beveridge curve. Specif-
ically, many economists, including Hall (2010 and 2011) note that the Beveridge curve has
shifted recently such that the eciency of labor market matching is signicantly lower today
than in the past. While our model does not have a vacancy dimension, it is consistent with
less ecient matching as modied households choose to stay in relatively poor labor markets,
and thus may be consistent with a shifted Beveridge Curve.
6 Conclusion
This paper has documented the slow recovery of the labor market from the Great Reces-
sion, and has analyzed the impact of mortgage modication programs on why recovery has
been delayed. These modication programs are means-tested, as the extent that mortgage
payments are reduced by a modication depends on a borrower's current economic cir-
cumstances, including circumstances in which income is limited to unemployment benets.
Means-testing thus changes the incentives for workers to relocate from relatively poor labor
markets to better labor markets. Our ndings indicate that these policies, as modeled in this
23version of the paper, can add about 0.5 percent to the unemployment rate, and reduce per
capita income by about 1 percent, which reects both lower employment and lower worker
productivity through skill erosion.
In terms of understanding why unemployment remains so high, it appears that other
factors in addition to modications are impacting current labor markets. Hall (2011) ana-
lyzes a model in which high real interest rates, combined with labor market rigidities, are
important. It would be of interest to blend Hall's world with the modications presented
here, as well as consider sectoral issues, given that some sectors of the economy, such as
housing, have been more severely impacted.
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